



The Cold Boot Attack and other Hot Stuff

by Pol Hölzmer

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try:


```
while audience.listen():  
    speaker.inform()  
    audience.learn()
```

```
audience.act()
```

```
except ExpectationsMissed:  
    print("Mission failed!")
```

Data Recovery Background

- Raw {Disk, File} {Viewer, Editor}



- File Signatures (excerpt)

Hex signature	ISO 8859-1	Extension
FF D8 FF E0	ÿØÿà	jpg
4D 5A	MZ	exe sys dll
5A 4D	ZM	exe
50 4B 03 04 50 4B 05 06 (empty archive) 50 4B 07 08 (spanned archive)	PK�� PK�� PK��	zip apk docx pptx xlsx
7F 45 4C 46	�ELF	
89 50 4E 47 0D 0A 1A 0A	%PNG������	png
25 50 44 46 2D	%PDF-	pdf
DO CF 11 E0 A1 B1 1A E1	Ðÿàÿ±���	doc xls ppt msi



Data Recovery

(EoL, Re-Buy)

Live Demo




Disk Encryption

Why? What?

Disk Encryption

What? Why?



Disk Encryption

Advantages

Why?

- Data **always** stored **encrypted**
- Data **only** readable for **trusted users**
- Plausible **Deniability**

When?

Prevent Unauthorized access when:

- Lost / Stolen / Public space
- Repair shops / End-of-life

What?

- **Notebooks** / Computer
- Smartphones / Tablets
- NAS / Server
- **External storage** devices


Disk Encryption

Disadvantages


- The process slows data **access time**
- Lost / Destroyed keys also **destroy data**
 - Recovery mechanisms
- **Swap**, Bootloader, /tmp, /var

Disk Encryption Vulnerabilities

- Break into **unlocked encrypted system**
- **Rubber-hose cryptanalysis** (Folter)
- **Coercion** (Nötigung)
- **Key extraction**



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Disk Encryption Methods

Common Features

- **Cryptographic container** that needs to be "unlocked" and mounted to access data
- **Passphrase** and/or **Keyfile** needs to be supplied by the user
- Actual **encryption key** can be derived from user key
 - “ is stored in **RAM**
 - “ is stored in in the **kernel keyring**



Separated their **layer of operation.**

Disk Encryption Methods

Stacked Filesystem Encryption

Layer that stacks on top of the **existing filesystem**

- Files are written to an **encryption-enabled folder**
- Special stacked pseudo-filesystem
- Encryption / Decryption on-the-fly
- **Underlying filesystem** writes to disk
- Files are stored together with **unencrypted files**

Disk Encryption Methods

Full Disk Encryption (FDE)

Operates below the **filesystem layer**

- Makes sure that **everything written** is encrypted
- looks like a large blob of **random data**
- **no way** of **determining filesystem** and **data** it contains
- **Mounting** the protected container

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Comparison	Full Disk Encryption	Stacked FS Encryption
Encrypts	Whole block devices	Files
Container for encrypted data	Disk / partition / virtual	Directory in existing FS
Relation to filesystem	Below	Above
File metadata encryption	✓	
Whole hard drive encryption	✓	
Swap space encryption	✓	
Dynamic space allocation		✓
Protect existing filesystems		✓
Offline file-based backups		✓

Disk Encryption Methods

Desktop Implementations

- macOS: **HFS+** (FDE), **APFS** (FDE / SFS) (FileVault / Data Protection)
- Windows: **BitLocker** (FDE)
- Linux:

	dm-crypt	VeraCrypt	eCryptfs	EncFS
Enc. stype	block device	block device	stacked FS	stacked FS
Encryption	kernel space	kernel space	kernel space	Userspace
Note	de-facto standard for block device encryption on Linux; very flexible	maintained fork of TrueCrypt	slightly faster than EncFS; individual encrypted files portable between systems	easiest one to use; supports non-root administration
Supported ciphers	Every cipher the kernel Crypto API offers	AES, Twofish, Serpent, Camellia, Kuznyechik	AES, Blowfish, Twofish...	AES, Blowfish, Twofish, and any other ciphers available on the system

Disk Encryption Methods

Mobile Implementations

- **File-Based Encryption (FBE):** Different keys for different files.
- iOS / iPadOS: Data Protection
 - file-based encryption
 - Secure Enclave
- Android:
 - Version ≤ 9 : full-disk encryption (dm-crypt)
 - Version ≥ 10 : file-based encryption
 - Version 10-12: full-disk encryption*

* only for devices that upgraded from a lower Android version

Disk Encryption Methods

Summary

Who to defend against?

- newbie hacker
- professional crypto analyst

What do you want to encrypt?

- user data
- system data
- both

How should encrypted blocks access?

- Passphrase
- key-file
- both

When should encrypted parts be unlocked?

- before / during boot
- at login
- on demand




Cryptography

Briefly...


Disk Encryption **Concept**

Basis Decryption Procedure




Disk Encryption Concept

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode



Disk Encryption **Concept**

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode




Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode decryption

Disk Encryption Concept

XTS Mode


(XOR-encrypt-XOR(XEX)-based tweaked-codebook mode with ciphertext stealing)



XEX with tweak and ciphertext stealing (XTS) mode encryption


Disk Encryption **Methods**

Cryptographic metadata



Disk Encryption **Methods**

Cryptographic metadata





Attacks

on Full Disk Encryption


Disk Encryption

Naïve Approach: Brute-force Passphrase

```
>>> hashcat -h | grep FDE
62XY | TrueCrypt | Full-Disk Encryption (FDE)
X | 1 = PBKDF2-HMAC-RIPEMD160 | Full-Disk Encryption (FDE)
X | 2 = PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 | Full-Disk Encryption (FDE)
X | 3 = PBKDF2-HMAC-Whirlpool | Full-Disk Encryption (FDE)
X | 4 = PBKDF2-HMAC-RIPEMD160 + boot-mode | Full-Disk Encryption (FDE)
Y | 1 = XTS 512 bit pure AES | Full-Disk Encryption (FDE)
Y | 1 = XTS 512 bit pure Serpent | Full-Disk Encryption (FDE)
Y | 1 = XTS 512 bit pure Twofish | Full-Disk Encryption (FDE)
Y | 2 = XTS 1024 bit pure AES | Full-Disk Encryption (FDE)
Y | 2 = XTS 1024 bit pure Serpent | Full-Disk Encryption (FDE)
Y | 2 = XTS 1024 bit pure Twofish | Full-Disk Encryption (FDE)
Y | 2 = XTS 1024 bit cascaded AES-Twofish | Full-Disk Encryption (FDE)
Y | 2 = XTS 1024 bit cascaded Serpent-AES | Full-Disk Encryption (FDE)
Y | 2 = XTS 1024 bit cascaded Twofish-Serpent | Full-Disk Encryption (FDE)
Y | 3 = XTS 1536 bit all | Full-Disk Encryption (FDE)
8800 | Android FDE <= 4.3 | Full-Disk Encryption (FDE)
12900 | Samsung DEK (Android FDE) | Full-Disk Encryption (FDE)
12200 | eCryptfs | Full-Disk Encryption (FDE)
137XY | VeraCrypt | Full-Disk Encryption (FDE)
14600 | LUKS | Full-Disk Encryption (FDE)
16700 | FileVault 2 | Full-Disk Encryption (FDE)
18300 | Apple File System (APFS) | Full-Disk Encryption (FDE)
```

Disk Encryption

Attack Tree by F-Secure





Cold-Boot Attack

Lest We Remember (2008)

Princeton University

Cold-Boot Attack

Principle

1. Attacker gets **physical access**
2. Attacker performs **cold reboot**
3. **Boot** into minimal OS via **USB** or **PXE**
4. Dump encryption **keys** from **memory**

Cold-boot Attack

Statistics by Kensington



One laptop is stolen every 53 seconds.


70 million smartphones are lost or stolen each year, with only 7 percent recovered.

80 percent of the cost of a lost laptop is from data breach. 52 percent of devices are stolen from the office/workplace, and 24 percent from conferences.

Cold-Boot Attack

Background

- **DRAM** characterizing remanence effects
- **Decay** at {Room (**seconds**), Reduced (**minutes**)} Temperature
- Error rate (Decayed Bits)
- Liquid Nitrogen
- **Cold** vs. **Hot** Reboot
- Memory wiping and footprint
- POST, ECC
- Key reconstruction



Cold-Boot Attack

Decay Pattern and Predictability




Figure 4: We loaded a bitmap image into memory on Machine A, then cut power for varying lengths of time. After 5 seconds (left), the image is indistinguishable from the original. It gradually becomes more degraded, as shown after 30 seconds, 60 seconds, and 5 minutes.

Cold-Boot Attack

Imaging Residual Memory

Imaging Tools

- PXE network boot
- **USB drives**
- EFI (Net)boot
- iPods

Imaging Attacks (and Problems)

- Simple reboots
- **RAM transplantation**



Cold-Boot Attack

Live Demo

Data Acquisition

Law Enforcement / Forensics





Secure Data Destruction

Recycling Loopback

Secure Data Destruction Evasion Techniques



Secure Data Destruction

Secret Service

Aus fünf Festplatten wurde Staub

Ex-Kanzleramtsmitarbeiter schredderte und tauchte unter. Reisswolf-Chef überrascht.



Secure Data Destruction

Simple Procedure



Secure Data Destruction

Darik's Boot and Nuke (DBAN)



```
Darik's Boot and Nuke 2.2.8

Options
Entropy: Linux Kernel (urandom)
PRNG: Merseme Twister (mt19937ar-cok)
Method: DoD Short
Verify: Last Pass
Rounds: 1

Statistics
Runtime:
Remaining:
Load Averages:
Throughput:
Errors:

Disks and Partitions

[wipe] SCSI Disk Seagate USB 2.0 Cable 014B 298GB 2HC015KJ
[wipe] SCSI Disk PI-239 USB 2.0 Drive 1.0B 298GB E203421L3JYJJP
[wipe] SCSI Disk 0.00 3920MB
[wipe] SCSI Disk USB DISK 2.0 PMAP 7385MB 047E09893020
[ ] SCSI Disk Generic Flash Disk 8.01 1760MB
[wipe] ATA Disk Hitachi HDT72101 ST60 931GB STF607MH36G3RK
[wipe] ATA Disk ST1000DM003-1CH1 HP33 931GB S1DBKMXN
[wipe] ATA Disk WDC WD10EAUS-00D 01.0 931GB WD-WCAU46192160
[wipe] ATA Disk ST3100052BAS CC38 931GB 9VP512KE
[wipe] ATA Disk SAMSUNG HD103SI 1AG0 931GB S1Y5J90Z158916
[wipe] ATA Disk Hitachi HCC54323 ES20 298GB E2034243C1BADD
[wipe] ATA Disk ST500LM012 HN-M5 2AR1 465GB S2TUJ9CC807924
▶ [wipe] ATA Disk TOSHIBA MK1059GS GU00 931GB X171TJ40T

P=PRNG M=Method V=Verify R=Rounds, J=Up K=Down Space=Select, F10=Exit
```

Learnings

- Local Data Protection:
 - **Full Disk Encryption** (Windows, MacOS, Linux, Android, IOS)
 - **Veracrypt** (External Devices, Plausible Deniability)
 - Hardware Encryption
- Secure (and sustainable) Data Destruction:
 - **DBAN** (Darik's Boot and Nuke)

Thank you for Listening and Learning!

It's **NOW** the time to **ACT!**

powered by

wirtschafts
agentur
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UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES

Sources

Content based on:

- <https://citp.princeton.edu/our-work/memory/>
- https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Disk_encryption
- <https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/FUSE>
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RqvPZnLkP70>
- <https://www.backblapple.com/en-us/HT204837>
- <https://jumpcloud.com/blog/what-is-full-disk-encryption-fde/>
- <https://www.slideshare.net/MSbluehat/bluehat-v18-an-icecold-boot-to-break-bit-locker>
- <https://www.slideshare.net/MSbluehat>
- <http://www.learnlinux.org.za/courses/build/fundamentals/fundamentals-all.html>
- https://www.garykessler.net/library/file_sigs.html
- <https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cold-boot-attack-steals-passwords-in-under-two-minutes/>
- <https://blog.f-secure.com/cold-boot-attacks/>
- https://www.brainkart.com/article/XTS-AES-Mode-For-Block-Oriented-Storage-Devices_8420/
- <https://dban.org/>
- <https://source.android.com/security/encryption/full-disk>
- <https://source.android.com/security/encryption/file-based>

Images taken from:

- Slide 3 (Left): <https://www.learnlinux.org.za/courses/build/internals/ch08s04.html>
- Slide 3 (Right): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures
- Slide 9: <https://xkcd.com/538/>
- Slide 10: <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:830892/FULLTEXT01.pdf>
- Slide 21: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cipher_Block_Chaining_Mode
- Slide 22: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_encryption_theory#XTS
- Slide 35 (Left): https://wiebetech.com/downloads/556/HotPlug_LT_User_Manual_REV1.0.pdf
- Slide 35 (Right): <https://www.logicube.com/>
- Slide 37 (Right): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b8ghF63cL3g>
- Slide 37 (Others): <https://duckduckgo.com/?q=kiss+juncker+kurz&iax=images&ia=images>
- Slide 38 (Left): <https://epaper.vn.at/politik/2019/07/23/aus-fuenf-festplatten-wurde-staub.vn>
- Slide 38 (Right): <https://resisswolf.com>