

CoAP proxies

Gateway features without gateway requirements


Christian Amsüss <christian@amsuess.com>

2022-06-02, IT-S NOW, Vienna

The Internet

when it still fit on a map

ARPANET LOGICAL MAP, MARCH 1977




(PLEASE NOTE THAT WHILE THIS MAP SHOWS THE HOST POPULATION OF THE NETWORK ACCORDING TO THE BEST INFORMATION OBTAINABLE, NO CLAIM CAN BE MADE FOR ITS ACCURACY)

NAMES SHOWN ARE IMP NAMES, (NOT NECESSARILY) HOST NAMES

The Internet

multiple applications



Outline

The Internet and the Internet of Things

Gateway features


The IETF IoT protocol stack: CoAP & team

Gateway features without gateways

Outlook and related work


Internet of Things

like the Internet



Internet of Things

as observed



Things of the Internet

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Constrained Device Limited code (≤ 100 KiB) and RAM (≤ 1 MiB), power constrained (e. g. battery or solar powered)

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Development stage Devices originally designed for the Internet

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

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- ▶ Avoiding the need for in-device cryptography

Stacks, side by side



CoAP by example

A request in a UDP datagram

POST coap://[2001:db8::1]/a/5/	4002303a161013
If-Match: 123abc	5913123abc
Content-Format: application/senml+cbor	1170
[{"bpi": 3, "n": "x", "d": 255},	ff82a363627069030061780218ff
{"n": "y", "d": 128}]	a2006179021880

Hex dump slightly rearranged to match HTTP-style option list.

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
Shared infrastructure?

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Shared infrastructure?



OSCORE and EDHOC: above and below CoAP

GET /path, Observe: 0 \rightarrow POST Observe: 0, enc(GET /path)

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Minimal overhead of encryption

OSCORE: few bytes per message, EDHOC: one round-trip, < 50 byte each

Half-time questions?

Gateway features without gateways: Base setup

- ▶ 6LoWPAN network (6TiSCH, [RFC 9030](#))
- ▶ border router has MUD configured firewall
- ▶ border router runs and announces a CoAP proxy
- ▶ no application specific software

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CoAP proxies can assist to avoid fragmentation.

Augmenting access

Providing a browser accessible local interface

For web hosted UIs: CoAP-over-WebSockets to CoAP-over-UDP proxying

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Locally hosted UIs: Could devices configure local HTTP reverse proxies?

Data preprocessing / aggregation

CoAP proxies can utilize advertised information to trigger additional behavior.

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Example (from [draft ietf-core-conditional-attributes](#)):

GET /temp?c.gt=-4 filters values above -4°C

Assistance in provisioning

“Pairing the device with the network”

6LoWPAN is joined by per-device preshared keys ([RFC 9031](#))

Zero-touch onboarding is work in progress as [draft ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join](#).

Distribution of firmware images

SUIT (Software Updates for IoT, [RFC 9019](#)) manifests and binaries can be distributed over CoAP.

CoAP proxies can be caching.

Power saving

CoAP proxies adjust (re)transmission parameters to local network.

Resource Directory ([RFC 9176](#)) spools discovery information to reduce the need for multicast discovery.

Customer experience

“The Internet is broken!”

Least technical; industry certification like WiFi?

Technical approaches:

- ▶ Feature discovery: report missing components.
- ▶ Graceful degradation

Prevent a compromised device from reaching third parties

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
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In Manufacturer Usage Descriptions (MUDs, [RFC 8520](#)), manufacturers describe intended behavior; firewalls can then configure themselves accordingly.

Prevent unauthorized parties from accessing the device

Same firewall argument.




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CoAP proxies can enforce reachability.

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
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... but that's not the same as only accepting authenticated peers.

Device could announce ACE server (e. g. per MUD policy), enforce authentication at proxy.



Avoiding the need for in-device cryptography

A proxy as before can be used without inner OSCORE...

...but do you really want to?

Summary: Feature comparison

- Application specific gateway All features; little reuse of code and hardware.
- Firewalled IP network Basic connectivity, fully generic router; security largely depending on device; no fancy features.
- CoAP proxy at edge Security properties on par with gateways, advanced features, some preprocessing possible; generic if feature set matches; some gaps in specifications.
- CoAP proxy with loaded code Feature parity with application specific gateways should be possible; research topic.

You don't use science to show that you're right, you use science to become right.

Mouseover of [XKCD 701](#)

The road ahead

- ▶ Full guard proxy security was a [research paper](#) in 2021, will need practical evaluation.
- ▶ Some gaps were surprising: Locally hosted UIs, provisioning, customer experience.
Taking these to research groups.
- ▶ An 80% solution is three mails to IANA away from being specified.

Want to play?

Let's try your application and see whether we have the right 80%!

Thank you

Discussion, Questions

Slides and further links are available on the conference website.

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